The Existence of God IIIc: The Teleological Argument - Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 2

Now we get to the meat of Philo's objections to the Teleological Argument. He first points out that this implies a mind similar to that of a human, which even Cleanthes must admit:

Add, a mind like the human, said Philo. I know of no other, replied Cleanthes.
And the liker the better, insisted Philo. To be sure, said Cleanthes.

Philo then shows that this leads to absurdities, and would never lead to the standard conception of God:

First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of
the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to
the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not
infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that
attribute to the Divine Being?

If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprize must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making.

And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs.

But further, Cleanthes: men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says Milton, animate the world. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us.

And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.? Epicurus maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly so much ridiculed by Cicero, becomes, according to you, solid and philosophical.

In rapid succession, Philo has devastated the Teleological Argument. Solely through an a posteriori approach, one could never determine the infinite nature of God, since humans cannot conceive nor observe infinity. One cannot prove the unity of God, nor his incorporeality, eternity, nor even his wisdom: He could have merely copied off of a blueprint!

Note that Philo nips the standard objections to the multiplicity of deities in the bud. He says (in a passage that I have not quoted) that the unity of God is not more parsimonious, since we have not established the existence of any deity separately from the Teleological Argument; nor could one say that multiple gods could not cooperate, as many Medieval philosophers maintained - after all, humans, who are far inferior, manage to come together to execute a design.

Cleanthes is left without response. And then Philo goes further:

The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the
SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.

Philo thus presents an alternative theory for the apparent complexity of the Universe. Cleanthes only offers the tepid reply that the Universe more resembles a vegetable, since it does not seem to be an active being, and that Philo's argument seems to imply the eternity of the Universe, which he has not demonstrated. However, neither of these really damage Philo's claim.

Demea, however, is confused. How does the Universe resemble a vegetable? Philo explains:

In like manner as a tree sheds its seeds into the neighbouring fields, and
produces other trees; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary
system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into the
surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed
of a world; and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and
star to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every where
surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new system.

Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal: and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal;

Thus, the Universe, which is itself alive, gives birth to new forms of life.

One might raise against this the objection that spontaneous generation has been firmly rejected by science. This, however, is surmountable. One could simply answer that the Universe "gives birth" at certain times, and does not simply form new life under certain experimental conditions.

Demea finds this theory very odd:

but what wild, arbitrary suppositions are these! What data have you
for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of
the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference
with regard to both? Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought
they to be a standard for each other?

But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? Can you explain their operations, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend?

Philo retorts that this is just as odd as the theory that the Universe is designed:

As much, at least, replied Philo, as Cleanthes can explain the
operations of reason, or anatomize that internal structure on which it depends.
But without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer,
that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you conclude
a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation, reason, mark
only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects are known, but whose
essence is incomprehensible; and one of these principles, more than the other,
has no privilege for being made a standard to the whole of nature.

Thus, since even Cleanthes admits the resemblance between the Universe and a vegetable, this position is at least as Cleanthes's. Even if Philo cannot fill in the details, which Demea challenges him to do, Philo can respond that neither can Cleanthes in explaining how God goes about designing the Universe.

Philo then executes his coup de grace:

And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these
reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still
persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the
Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature
with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever
he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore
he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never mistaken
in choosing the means to any end: but the course of Nature tends not to human or
animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the
whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and
infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy
resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?

With all the suffering in the world, how could we derive the perfect benevolence of God? Demea tries to deny the existence of evil by positing a future existence, i.e. Heaven:

This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this life but a
moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, therefore, are
rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence.

Cleanthes rejects this, saying we cannot make such a supposition without evidence:

No! replied Cleanthes, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be admitted,
contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be
known but from its known effects? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from
the apparent phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another, is building
entirely in the air; and the utmost we ever attain, by these conjectures and
fictions, is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we,
upon such terms, establish its reality.

Instead, Cleanthes tries to deny the predominance of evil over good; he claims that over all, the universe is a good place. Philo disagrees, but he is willing to concede the point; he even is willing to say that it is possible that God is indeed perfectly benevolent. But we would never reach such a conclusion!

Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of
beings, animated and organized, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious
variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living
existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each
other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or
odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind
Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her
lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive
children!

Thus, we do not see goodness in the Universe, but just different life forms struggling for survival, with pleasures and pains associated with that struggle.

Coming from the background of Western society, I find it hard to accept the "vegetation theory" as more plausible than the "design theory." Nevertheless, Philo's other objections seriously undermine the Teleological Argument, and must be taken into consideration when discussing it.

The Existence of God IIIb: The Teleological Argument - Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 1

In my previous post, I started discussion of the Teleological Argument with Dawkins's "Ultimate Boeing 747 Challenge," which I thought the Teleological Argument could withstand. I will now discuss Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, perhaps one of the most thorough discussions of the Teleological Argument, even though it was written about 100 years before Darwin wrote On the Origin of Species.


Cleanthes, one of the characters, begins the discussion:

Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it:
you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an
infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a
degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these
various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other
with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever
contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature,
resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance;
of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the
effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy,
that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar
to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to
the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori,
and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and
his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

Demea, the character who represents traditional religious thought, vigorously protests this argument:

What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No abstract arguments! No
proofs a priori! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by
philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject
than experience and probability?

This is an important thing to note. Only with an a priori argument could we possibly prove absolutely that God exists and has certain attributes. With an a posteriori argument, it is a matter of weighing all evidence, to see whether the evidence supports a claim in either direction. Thus one is reduced to saying that such-and-such a belief is only probably true.

Philo, the chracter who most probably represents Hume's own opinions, builds on this:

What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much
that all religious arguments are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that
they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior
kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity,
we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of
this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference.
The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar
event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever
you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish
proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy,
which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced
the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes
place in Titius and Maevius. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is
only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in
men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer
the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood
circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy,
are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.

Thus it is not clear how strong the evidence is of a designer.

Cleanthes responds:

But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe
so slight a resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and
arrangement of every part?

Philo replies:

Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he
would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind
of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or
situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives
could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his
fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he
adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally
possible.

Thus, it is not clear that one could dervie what led to the current situation, without actually seeing what led to it. Nevertheless, one could respond that the analogy is strong enough to merit this. Philo realizes this, so he tries to poke holes in Cleanthes's argument:

And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow
corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety
can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a
peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms,
is in comparison a pardonable sophism.

Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine. A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we then pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?

Philo so far makes two points: that the Teleological Argument is a vast generalization; and that it is an argument from ignorance, given how little was known of nature at the time the dialogue was written. Nevertheless, even if an argument is based on generalizations and arguments from ignorance, if it is the best response, then it should be the one held until evidence shows to the contrary. This is basically how Cleanthes responds:

but that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the
similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this similarity is
self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; what more is
requisite to shew an analogy between their causes, and to ascertain the origin
of all things from a divine purpose and intention?

Philo responds essentially with Dawkins's argument, which I dealt with in the previous post:

If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from enquiries a priori)
be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, this
sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, or universe
of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, or universe of
objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. For
what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or
inference? In an abstract view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty
attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them.

Cleanthes responds that nevertheless, there seems to be a cause:

The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the
plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the
clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join
in the same testimony: the whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the praises
of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You
start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: you ask me, what is the cause of
this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity;
and here I stop my enquiry.

Philo replies that if so, it does not help to push the argument off a step:

If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can absolutely give an
explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any advantage to shove off for a
moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, must immediately, in its full
force, recur upon me.

This post has already gone on for a while, so I will continue the analysis of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in another post.

The Existence of God IIIa: The Teleological Argument - Ultimate Boeing 747 Gambit

Now that I have discussed the a priori arguments for the existence of God, the Cosmological and Ontological Arguments, it is time to discuss the main a posteriori argument - the Teleological Argument, or Argument from Design or Purpose (though one could argue that my version of the Cosmological Argument is also a posteriori, depending on one's view of causation - see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article, "Kant and Hume on Causality").

I believe most readers are familiar with the Teleological Argument. It is, I believe, the most commonly used argument to demonstrate God's existence. The basic premise is that the Universe (or something within the universe) resembles an object too complex ot have occurred simply through random processes without purpose. Thus, there must be a Designer, namely, God.

Now there are two main streams of objections to this argument. The more common is that the Universe could be the way it is simply through naturalistic, undesigned processes, such as evolution. Now, evolution is a very long and difficult topic, so I will save that for a different post (or several posts).

The other stream is that even if it does appear designed, one runs into problems. A famous argument of this kind is Dawkins's "ultimate Boeing 747 gambit." There is a famous quote by Fred Hoyle where he claims that the Universe being the way it is now without design is like the wind randomly blowing together random scraps of metal and forming a 747. Dawkins replied, that if something could design an object so complex, then it must be at least as complex itself. Thus the Teleological Argument, according to Dawkins, begs the question.

Many religious philosophers have responded by saying that God, as a spirit, is not complex. I feel, though, that while this argument would satisfactorily rebut his claim if true, the question is how we can maintain a doctrine of spirits. After all, do we have any empirical evidence that spirits which are capable of design, yet without complexity, exist? We only see that intelligence exists with complex mechanisms, such as brains (and increasingly, with computers). Thus these religious philosophers would have to prove that intelligence is possible without complexity, based on empirical evidence. This will be hard, though, since one cannot directly observe spirits. Perhaps they would try to argue this from the existence of souls, but this is a separate argument, and I will deal with it in a separate post on the mind-body problem at some point.

I have a different objection to Dawkins's challenge: it doesn't matter if the Designer is more complex! After all, the Designer could have existed since the beginning of the Universe. Thus it would not need a designer, since it has always existed (for more on this idea, see my post on the Cosmological Argument). Thus, with evidence in favor of a Designer, and no question-begging necessary, the argument as it is might hold.

There is also to consider other objections, which David Hume most notably brought up in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, that the Teleological Argument falls short of what it is trying to prove. I will consider this in my next post, where I will walk through Hume's arguments.

The Existence of God II: The Ontological Argument

The second species of arguments in favor of God's existence are the ontological ones. These come in several forms:

A) I have an idea of God.
This idea must have come from somewhere.
The only thing capable of providing this idea is God.
Therefore, God exists.

Hobbes criticized this argument by saying that we have an idea of unicorns. However, they do not exist. Then how did we get the idea? Easy: we combined a horse and a rhinoceros's horn, or something to similar effect.

On the surface, we can dismiss Hobbes's criticism. After all, we have an idea of an infinite God, and since we have never observed an infinite object in nature, we cannot get this idea from simply combining several things that we have observed in our head.

However, the major Empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) all reject this response. True, they say, there is no way to observe an infinite item, so this cannot be the source of an idea of infinity; nonetheless, you don't have any idea of infinite anyway. This is because infinite is not a number; it is just the concept that there is no upper bound to the number. Then how do we get this concept of an infinite God? By, as Hume said, increasing the number without limit. But why did we do this for God? Hume says in his Natural History of Religion,

Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessor in swelling up the titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed; till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no farther progress.

Therefore, this version of the Ontological Argument falls flat.

B) God is the most-perfect being: omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, etc.
If God did not exist, then I could think of a more perfect being: one that did exist.
Therefore, if God did not exist, we would have a contradiction.
Therefore, God exists.

Kant succinctly responded: Existence is not a predicate. Existence is the basis for the attribution of predicates. If one denies that something exists, then one denies the description of it as well. So, if God does not exist, there is not most-perfect being.

If one persists in insisting that existence is indeed a predicate, I can simply respond that it then might contradict the other predicates in God: namely, its existence might preclude its omniscience, etc.

I also would like to point out that perfection is a relative term. Something cannot be simply perfect; it has to be perfect for something. How, then, do we know our idea of perfection is correct? Alternatively, there could be different perfections for different things. Does that mean that there are different most-perfect beings, such as a most-perfect cow, or a most perfect balloon?

Supposedly some philosophers, such as Alvin Plantinga, have responses for this, but I feel this is tough to refute.

C) God is a possible necessary being.
If it is possibly necessary, then it is necessary.
Therefore God is a necessary being.
Therefore God exists.

We can simply respond to this that if it is possibly necessary, then it is not necessary, so God might not exist. The confusion arises from using "necessary" in two different senses - necessary in that the world depends on Him, and necessary in that the world is inconceivable without Him.

I hope I correctly represented all of the positions here.

The Existence of God I: The Cosmological Argument

I'll start this weighty topic with a quote from David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in response to Demea's presentation of the Cosmological Argument:

But dropping all these abstractions, continued Philo, and confining ourselves to
more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument a
priori has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical
head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding
from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth through
obscurity, and, contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same habit
of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of
good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in
such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it
lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive their religion
from other sources than from this species of reasoning.

The question, before we proceed, is this: do we need any independent proof of God's existence to demonstrate the truth of religion? After all, even if we do accomplish this, what difference does it make? Do we instantly know what religion entails? No; we must rely on revelation for this. If so, then what difference does this proof make at all? We must rely on an adequately-proved revelation in any case, thus obviating the need for a proof of the existence of God.

This challenge is very interesting and important to bear in mind. However, I think I can come up with a response to it. In the process of proving the existence of a god, one may come to simultaneously find that this god, through the manifestation of the proof, must be interested in humankind. Thus, we would expect to see some divine involvement in human affairs, such as commanding man how to act. Therefore, any extant revelations would be granted additional weight in determining their validity.

Now, whether a proof of God's interest in humankind is possible, I will not deal with here. For now, I will content myself to discussing the Cosmological Argument.

Growing up, the reason that I believed in God, was, essentially, the Cosmological Argument: every effect must have a cause, and we can trace the causes back to God. The criticism, "Who created God?" didn't bother me - God was the "Prime Mover," and thus didn't need a cause. One could not say the same, though, for the Universe, as it clearly had a beginning - the Big Bang. Since the appearance of the Universe in such a fashion seems to violate the laws of physics, I assumed that there must be something that can break these laws to create the Universe - namely, God.

However, as I got older, I realized that there are many problems with this argument. Firstly, I had not demonstrated that God must be the first cause - there could be something else before him that caused him, and something that caused that, extending back to an infinite amount of time. However, I was able to respond to this in two ways: first, that it does not matter whether God is the Prime Mover or not (after all, the pagan gods were all born in some manner of theogony or another); and second, that the chain of causes and effects could not go back to infinity - an infinite amount of time can never go to completion, so the Universe can not be infinitely old.

However, there is a more devastating criticism of the Cosmological Argument: so what? All we have proven is that there is a first cause; we have not proven that this is intelligent, continues to act within the Universe, cares about mankind, or anything else. This is exactly the criticism Hume had for the argument, and it stands.

We are, nevertheless, left with a problem: how did the Universe start, if it broke the laws of physics? Now, while this is not a science blog, I will offer the following suggestion (though it is probably better to talk to a professional physicist about this instead). We assumed that it broke the laws of physics. However, we assumed that the laws of physics were in place when the Universe appeared. This, however, we can deny. The Universe, along with everything that governs it, such as gravity, electromagnetism, and even space and time did not exist prior to the universe. Thus the universe could "spontaneously" (obviously not actually spontaneously, since time did not exist without the universe) appear, without any violations of the laws of physics.

The Nature of the Dispute

Before I actually touch any of the issues, I want to discuss why the argument over belief in Judaism (or any other religion) exists at all.

When I hear and read about the arguments, they become heated very quickly. The believer quickly accuses the skeptic of having insincere motives (i.e. he/she is just looking for an excuse to do whatever he/she wants), and the skeptic accuses the believer of being an idiot. This again leaves me in the position of Elihu ben Berachel - the argument quickly runs out of hand, with no side making any progress. Let us first analyze, are these accusations from either side true?

First I will deal with the position of the believer. From my personal experience, I must admit that they are for the most part correct. Now I expect a lot of flack for this statement. But let us analyze this critically. Who is more likely to question the validity of the religion in which they participate? Is it not the person who is unhappy with the religion? It seems to me that the person who is content with his lot is indeed more likely to not question it. This, I have seen, is often borne out in my experience. What is interesting is that often the people who fall into this category don't even realize it - they think that they have thought their conclusions out, but clearly they have not.

However, it is absolutely not true that this is universally the case. There are, indeed, many issues that must be dealt with in examining religion. The believer quickly jumps on the cases where there may be ulterior motives and generalizes. I personally know people who genuinely struggled with the issues, patiently weighing the arguments on both sides, until they came to a decision. I believe I fall into such a category - I struggled with the issues for over two years until I came to a decision (even consciously giving more weight to the religious perspective - I'll discuss this in the next paragraph).

Additionally, the idea that there is a motivation to become a nonbeliever is ridiculous, once one thinks about it. Consider the options - you get a little bit of good now for sinning and a whole lot of bad later in terms of punishment, or you can do something that may cause you a bit of discomfort now (or even some good now - depending whether one likes to perform the mitzvot), and a whole lot of good later. Clearly the motivation is to choose the latter. Note that I have now turned Pascal's Wager on its head - clearly the motivation lies in the direction of becoming religious, if one is interested in long-term planning. Additionally, as I mentioned above, there may be motivation to perform the mitzvot themselves - I personally enjoy Shabbat very much, and was thus interested in keeping the meaning behind it. Thus the skeptic could argue in a similar manner that the believer is seduced into believing.

Returning now to the skeptic's position, I think it suffices to say that this is clearly not true. There are plenty of extremely intelligent Orthodox people, as well as plenty of extremely ignorant ones; however, this is just as true for the nonbelievers as well. Much of the beliefs simply stem from the exposure to the arguments, upbringing, life experience, etc.

If only we could avoid all the insults that universally get tossed around in these kind of discussions.

Intro to this blog

Before I actually start writing about anything, I should probably mention a little bit about myself, and what the purpose of this blog is.

I come to the blogging sphere searching for the truth, wherever it may lead, in the realm of Jewish belief. Now, obviously, there are plenty of blogs already out there that deal at length with this subject. Unfortunately, upon reading them, I find myself in the position of Elihu ben Berachel - almost none of the blogs seem to touch the crux of the matters. They often do not deal with many of the major issues, and when they do, the protagonists on both sides offer arguments that I feel I can refute.

So, I feel that it is time for a fresh start. This blog will be purely dedicated to expounding on the issues involved in belief in Orthodox Judaism. I am not afraid to challenge positions held on either side. I welcome all criticism of my positions - I wish to form correct opinions, not simply throw preconceived views at the readers. However, this does not mean that I do not have already thought about the issues - I have formed opinions based on my reflections and readings. Please bear this in mind.

Also, please note that no ad hominem remarks will be tolerated, no matter whom the come from. If I see any such comments, I will delete them. I will try to hold to this standard myself. If any reader thinks that I have made an ad hominem remark, please let me know and I will modify my post.

Now that I have introduced this blog, it is time to post.