Aren't Skeptics Guilty of Special Pleading?

I promised this post to Mr. Stein (who goes by Jewish Phulosopher) a while ago, but I've been rather busy. I apologize for the delay.

I want to point out that those who are interested in these types of blogs should applaud Mr. Stein. That's right, applaud. Why? He provides the blogosphere with insight to counter what he believes to be a true threat. It is important to have people who are willing to stand up to skeptics, try to argue against their positions, and make them back up their claims. Though many people take issue with his tactics, which I must myself admit seem to be a bit extreme, I only wish that there would be more people in the Orthodox Jewish community who attempt to respond to skeptics with as much passion as he has.

Mr. Stein recently commented on my blog that I am claiming that "you need not a accept a religion as true until it is proven beyond doubt. Can anything be proven beyond doubt?"

Let me try to explain what, I believe, Mr. Stein is trying to say here. Suppose you open up a veyr old history book, and start reading in it. You see some random fact about a major event that took place. You then read some other books which also referred to this event. Mr. Stein says, you would probably accept this fact. So why not in the case of the Torah? In fact, there is an even stronger case here, because of the Kuzari Principle. Is it because you do not believe in anything physical? But how can one prove that there is nothing physical, if it is not visible to the senses? And if there is evidence that it does exist, from historical sources, then one should believe in it! Thus, I believe Mr. Stein is saying that the skeptic is guilty of special pleading.

This is a very strong claim. If Mr. Stein is right, then all skeptics are denying statements that any reasonable, neutral observer would accept as fact. Thus, Mr. Stein claims, skeptics must be delusional. Since, he feels, the strongest desire which Judaism does not allow is the sexual urge, he places the blame on that.

Mr. Stein, however, is ignoring some very important caveats that require extra evidence in this situation. The issue is the level of evidence required for miracles. Since the classic work on this subject is David Hume's On Miracles, I will draw from there in formulating the skeptic's response to Mr. Stein.

The first thing Hume points out is that miracles are very unusual experiences. Thus, we must take into mind that there occurence is very rare. Hume then asks, which will occur more frequently: that a story of a miracle is made up, or the miracle actually occurred? The reasonable person will believe in that which statistically occurs more often, until further evidence sways the statistical likelihood.

Hume then goes into the evidence which is available for the existence of miracles. The most common evidence is, of course, human testimony. But, Hume points out, testimony is often contradicted by circumstantial evidence, other testimony, or the unreliable character of the witnesses, to name a few. Thus, with enough evidence to the contrary, such as that miracles rarely happen, if ever, should at least put their testimony in doubt.

Hume noticed the counterargument that Mr. Stein put forth, which I paraphrased: that the skeptic does not believe in anything not physical, despite no evidence to establish such a claim. He compares this to the Indian prince who had never seen ice, that when he was told that water becomes hard when it is cold (i.e. becomes ice), was absolutely certain that the person telling him was trying to pull his leg. Therefore, Hume proceeds to analyze the reliability of the evidence available for miracles.

Hume first points out that

The passion of surprize and wonder, arising from miracles, being an
agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events,
from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy
this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which
they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by
rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.

Thus the stories of miracles are likely to spread without thoroughly being checked for validity. Hume also offers other possible reasons to spread such stories: one may be deluded into thinking that such a thing was actually a miracle, someone may wish to spread his/her religion, or he may wish to deceive the general populace. I'm sure everyone can agree that there are many false claims of miracles. Even the Vatican is very cautious against declaring every claim of a miracle as such, and many false miracles have been exposed over the years. But the rest of purported miracles may simply be reports of charlatans who were not caught. Why, then do people believe it? Due to ignorance (which was more rampant than many people realize possible before literacy became common), or eloquence.

Hume also points out that many things in the ancient past, such as wars, disease, hunger, or storms were believed to be due to supernatural causes. Now, we know this not to be the case, as we can explain and predict these things perfectly well from natural causes. However, the belief in a supernatural realm has persisted nonetheless, which may further enhance the belief in miracles.

This is important. To the ancient past, supernatural intervention was thought part of everyday life, and was needed to explain things. Thus it may have solely been established as such, and over time, the beliefs developed so that divine beings were involved personally in people's lives. If the original basis for such a belief is faulty, then shouldn't all subsequent beliefs based on this, such as miracles, be held suspect?

Hume pushes on, noting how it is strange that there seem to be so much fewer miracles in the present time, when we have made so many advances in science and mathematics, than when people were ignorant and apt to believe in bizarre superstitions, such as Paganism.

Additionally, each religion claims miracles which establish its religion as true, while the other as false. Does this not diminish the certainty that their miracles actually occurred? After all, each makes equally strong claims that negate the claims of the others.

I'm sure that Mr. Stein would point out that here the case is different because of the Kuzari Principle. I would also like to point out that all religions go through processes in which beliefs become built on preexisting beliefs, which is readily seen in the written records of the Catholic Church. So too, the story of mass revelation at Sinai could just be such a process, in which the story got built up, as I have suggested in a previous post. In fact, the case would be even stronger, as records were not kept to same level that they were in the Catholic Church to document such a process, which the Catholics could have ostensibly used to notice that they were gradually creating a story which was not what the original Christians probably believed. In fact, we have virtually no archaeological written records on any topic from the Bayit Rishon period. We only have a few records that were inscribed in stone as monuments; while we have Christian records that were copied throuhgout the Middle Ages to the present. Thus the objection that there should be written records is not a good one.

Thus, the skeptic can well claim that there is not much more evidence in favor of Judaism than in favor of any other religion, which is not very good.

Bereishit 1 and the Creation of the Universe

Up to now, my posts have been mostly against an Orthodox position. In this post, I will, at least mildly, support one.

I'm sure most readers are aware of the apparent contradiction between Bereishit 1 and the scientifically established date of the Universe. The Torah says the world was created in six days; science, over billions of years.

There are several ways in which Orthodox Jews have attempted to tackle this very strong challenge. I will start with that of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, who stated that the world, indeed, was created in six days, but was made to look a lot older in order to test us.

This response has come under a lot of fire. Rabbi Slifkin, I believe, responded by saying that one could just as well say that the Torah was given to test us to see how foolishly we would act in believing something against all empirical evidence. After all, God established both the Universe and the Torah, which seem to contradict each other; how do we know which one is right?

Bertrand Russell's Omphalos Hypothesis is another way of responding. He suggests that it is also possible to say that the Universe was created 5 minutes ago. You may respond, "but I remember events that happened more than 5 minutes ago!" This, however, is not a valid reason to reject the hypothesis, as everything was created 5 minutes ago as if it had existed for much longer. By performing a reductio ad absurdum, Russell shows that both hypotheses are absurd, and one should just follow the empirical evidence.

The second approach is to say that "days" in Bereishit 1 are not really days. After all, how could they if there was no sun until the fourth day?

This approach overlooks an important, but not well known fact of ancient cosmology: many people did not think that the Sun caused the light of day, but rather coincided with the light of day. After all, on a cloudy day, it is still light, but there is no Sun! And at dawn and dusk, it is also light, but there is no Sun! Let us examine Bereishit 1, and see how this fits in:
1:5 God calls the light, day, and the dark, night. No mention of the sun here; it just seems that light=day and dark=night.
1:14 God creates the heavenly beings to separate between day and night. It does not say that they are the essence of day and night.
1:15 The heavenly beings are to shine on the Earth - the Moon at night, the Sun during the day. This is more evident during the next Passuk:
1:16 The Sun reigns over the day, and the Moon reigns over the night. Nothing about their appearance that causes it to be day or night; after all, the Moon can appear during the day, but that does not make it both day and night!

I admit that the evidence is certainly not conclusive in favor of the hypothesis offered here, and I don't remember the source where I saw this, so don't trust me on it. Please try to look up the source if you are interested.

There are other problems, though, with the "days are not days" approach. The order of creation seems to be completely off. Trees and other plants form before the Sun does. What is their source of light? Is it the original light of day? Then we have the problem that I raised earlier about what defined the day in ancient times. Also, there is no water above the sky (you may be inclined to say that this is a mischaracterization of Day 2, but we see from the story of Noach and Iyov 38 that it almost definitely means a body of water above the sky). The order of the creation of the animals is questionable, but not conclusive either way.

The final approach that I will bring up is that of Cassuto and others, that the Torah is not trying to actually describe creation in Bereishit 1, but rather trying to play off of the existing mythologies of the ancient world for its own theological purposes. Bereishit 1, indeed, bears somewhat of a resemblance to the Enuma Elish, which describe the theogony/cosmogony of the ancient Mesopotamians. The Torah could be, for instance, trying to reverse the theology of the ancient Pagans, by stating that it was not the cosmos which created the gods, but rather God who created the cosmos.

This last approach is, I believe, tenable, and therefore is the one I would support if holding an Orthodox Jewish opinion.

The Kuzari Principle

Probably the most famous argument used to "prove" Judaism is the Kuzari Principle. I will briefly summarize it:

1) Any event that would be very difficult to establish as fact without its actual occurrence is, in most likelihood, true.
2) The giving of the Torah at Mt. Sinai is such an event, as there were several million people present.
3) Therefore, the Torah is given by God, as witnessed by these millions of people.
4) Therefore, Judaism is true.

I won't get involved here in how we would know that the Torah Sheb'al Peh is true, because that is a separate issue. I will confine myself to the argument above.

The issue is with Premise (2). How do we know that there were several million people there? From the Torah itself. Isn't this circular reasoning?

Those who support the argument respond as follows: if someone tried to introduce the Torah at a later point, everyone would know it was false. They would all say, "why have I never heard of such a momentous event before from my parents? They would have told me of such a fantastic story if it had really occurred. Therefore, you are a charlatan."

The problem with this is that it (a) assumes that traditions maintain the same form when repeated from generation to generation, (b) that anyone introducing the Torah would be starting a new religion from scratch, and (c) that the average person was well-versed in the specifics of the religion, not just some rituals.

In reality, it is quite clear that traditions do change from generation to generation. This can even be tracked through literature of various movements, such as the early Church or Kabbalah. So, the assumption that traditions are transmitted untouched is fallacious.

I will attempt to construct a possible pathway for the tradition coming down as is, without any revelation actually occurring:
Generation 1: Flees from Egypt. Forms a legal code in the desert. Sees God's involvement in both, just like Sennacherib sees his god Ashur's hand in his military victories. Also could see law as divinely inspired the same way Jews nowadays consider their Rabbis to be divinely inspired, or Catholics see the Pope as divinely inspired.
Generation 2: "God took as out of Egypt, and gave us the law, through Moses." This is not such a big leap from the previous generation.
Generation 3: "God took us out mightily from Egypt, and gave us the law through revelation through Moses."
Generation 4: "God smote the Egyptians as he took us out, and revealed himself at Sinai to the whole people as he gave the law to Moses.

Look how quickly the tradition can plausibly change. Does anyone note the similarities between this and the process of changing the story in George Orwell's Animal Farm, which is based on the historical Soviet Revolution? (Note: this is not to say that it actually happened this way, just that it is possible. It also may have taken more time than this for these opinions to have developed.)

There may also have been other factors involved. For example, the story could have been poetically embellished, and then at some later point, it was taken to be a true story.

The Torah could also have been forced upon the Jews by the point of the sword by a zealously religious king, who was listening to the opinions of the priests. This can possibly be seen in the time of Chizkiyahu, but even more so in the time of Yoshiahu.

Or it could be a combination of all of these, and possibly other ideas I haven't thought of, all of which have historical precedent.

People also sometimes try to claim that this argument for Judaism is special, not because it proves that Judaism is right, but because Judaism is unique in claiming the existence of such a widespread miracle. This is not true, as I can give many examples of historical claims that happened to wide numbers of people, were accepted by wide numbers of people as true, yet I'm sure the average reader will allow to be false:
1) Epic of Gilgamesh - Utnapishtim is saved by one of the gods after the rest of the gods decide to destroy the world. The entirety of mankind witnessed this, no? If you wish to say that the flood is true, but it was distorted by the pagans, then why not say that the Exodus is true, but distorted by the Jews, who added miracles to a natural story? Is it merely because it would be difficult to get the stories to coincide with so many people? But why not just ask Utnapishtim/Noach, who was still alive for hundreds of years thereafter, to tell his version fo the story?
2) The Aeneid - the gods reveal themselves at several points to all of the Trojans, who are the ancestors of the Romans.
3) Maccabees 3 - Angels reveal themselves to the entire Jewish community of Alexandria and save them. This story was accepted as historical by many Jewish and Christian groups, yet it is not by Orthodox Jews.
4) The Splitting of the Moon - a miracle witnessed by many Muslims which confirmed the truth of the prophecy of Muhammad. If one wishes to attempt to falsify this by saying that others in locations far away from Arabia did not see this, but rather saw the moon remain whole, this does not solve the problem. Both led to entire people believing in a miracle that confirms the proof of their religion, yet it is possible that neither is true.
5) The Miracle of the Sun - a miracle that occurred in Portugal for tens of thousands of Catholics. See Wikipedia.
6) The Soviet Revolution - after the Revolution, the Soviets completely rewrote their history to grant themselves a greater role in overthrowing the Tsar. They succeeded despite the involvement of millions of the populace in the process who should have known that their claims were not true.

I'm sure I'm missing some other examples.

There is also the issue that many of the numbers in Tanach are likely inflated, but I won't get into that right now.

In any case, I don't think the Kuzari Principle should be granted any value, for the reasons listed above.

The Existence of God IV: Pascal's Wager

Any discussion of the existence of God would be deficient without mentioning Pascal's Wager. After all, isn't the expected value from religion infinitely higher than without religion?

I'm not sure if the argument works so well, though. Consider the following: I tell you that I have experienced a revelation from sea people, who say that they will do you incredible good if you act a certain way, but they will do you incredible harm if you act a different way. In my story, I just so happen to craft the manner in which the sea people will execute their will as to make it nonfalsifiable (as the idea of Olam Haba is). Would any of you believe me? No, you say, you have written a post on Pascal's Wager, so your story clearly relates to your position on this principle. So I slightly change the situation. A random person in the street tells you this. He appears to be completely sane, and completely serious. He reacts in a very disappointed manner if you doubt him. Would you still believe him?

It seems to me that most people would not. They would at least need some stronger evidence to establish the truth of what he said. After all, he may very well be delusional, may have misinterpreted a situation, or seen something that can be explained through alternative phenomena. So, we would ignore his story because it is very unlikely.

Now, one could respond that one could equally apply this to bizarre scientific phenomena. After all, it would run contrary to all experience, and can cause great good or harm. A prime example of this is nuclear power. No one had any conception of the power contained in atomic nuclei before the 20th Century. Or, more recently, one could apply this to subatomic particles. This ignores, though, the falsifiability criteria. One would be more likely to credit a scientific statement, as one believes that since the scientist has no reason to lie, and his method for deducing his statements on natural phenomena are repeatable, so one could catch him if he did lie, it is exceedingly likely that the scientist is telling the truth.

Two sources I would like to mention at this point - Noam Chomsky's quote on science vs. postmodernism, and David Hume's On Miracles.

I now go further. It is important to note that all religions could make this claim. Thus, Pascal's Wager equally leads to Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Classical Paganism, etc. The only way out of this is to use empirical evidence to weigh one over the other- which, as we have said before, negates the whole value of Pascal's Wager! Pascal's Wager depends on being true without any evidence to support religion, yet one must recourse to evidence to establish which religion is correct.

Also, Pascal's Wager treats God's judgment as if it were some sort of blind event. Pascal's Wager might work for, say, the approach of a tornado; but for judgment? There is a universal principle in justice called the burden of proof. Since God wants us to do something, and on the basis of our consequent actions we will be brought to justice, is not the burden of proof on him to establish that we must do these actions? After all, as the Talmud says, Hamotzi mechaveiro alav hara'aiah.

Considering all this, I would think that at best, Pascal's Wager can work as a tiebreaker, where there is already enough evidence to make the case plausible, but not 100% certain. It does not work independently of any other basis for religion.

The Existence of God IIIc: The Teleological Argument - Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 2

Now we get to the meat of Philo's objections to the Teleological Argument. He first points out that this implies a mind similar to that of a human, which even Cleanthes must admit:

Add, a mind like the human, said Philo. I know of no other, replied Cleanthes.
And the liker the better, insisted Philo. To be sure, said Cleanthes.

Philo then shows that this leads to absurdities, and would never lead to the standard conception of God:

First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of
the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to
the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not
infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that
attribute to the Divine Being?

If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprize must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making.

And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs.

But further, Cleanthes: men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says Milton, animate the world. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us.

And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.? Epicurus maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly so much ridiculed by Cicero, becomes, according to you, solid and philosophical.

In rapid succession, Philo has devastated the Teleological Argument. Solely through an a posteriori approach, one could never determine the infinite nature of God, since humans cannot conceive nor observe infinity. One cannot prove the unity of God, nor his incorporeality, eternity, nor even his wisdom: He could have merely copied off of a blueprint!

Note that Philo nips the standard objections to the multiplicity of deities in the bud. He says (in a passage that I have not quoted) that the unity of God is not more parsimonious, since we have not established the existence of any deity separately from the Teleological Argument; nor could one say that multiple gods could not cooperate, as many Medieval philosophers maintained - after all, humans, who are far inferior, manage to come together to execute a design.

Cleanthes is left without response. And then Philo goes further:

The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the
SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.

Philo thus presents an alternative theory for the apparent complexity of the Universe. Cleanthes only offers the tepid reply that the Universe more resembles a vegetable, since it does not seem to be an active being, and that Philo's argument seems to imply the eternity of the Universe, which he has not demonstrated. However, neither of these really damage Philo's claim.

Demea, however, is confused. How does the Universe resemble a vegetable? Philo explains:

In like manner as a tree sheds its seeds into the neighbouring fields, and
produces other trees; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary
system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into the
surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed
of a world; and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and
star to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every where
surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new system.

Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal: and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal;

Thus, the Universe, which is itself alive, gives birth to new forms of life.

One might raise against this the objection that spontaneous generation has been firmly rejected by science. This, however, is surmountable. One could simply answer that the Universe "gives birth" at certain times, and does not simply form new life under certain experimental conditions.

Demea finds this theory very odd:

but what wild, arbitrary suppositions are these! What data have you
for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of
the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference
with regard to both? Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought
they to be a standard for each other?

But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? Can you explain their operations, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend?

Philo retorts that this is just as odd as the theory that the Universe is designed:

As much, at least, replied Philo, as Cleanthes can explain the
operations of reason, or anatomize that internal structure on which it depends.
But without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer,
that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you conclude
a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation, reason, mark
only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects are known, but whose
essence is incomprehensible; and one of these principles, more than the other,
has no privilege for being made a standard to the whole of nature.

Thus, since even Cleanthes admits the resemblance between the Universe and a vegetable, this position is at least as Cleanthes's. Even if Philo cannot fill in the details, which Demea challenges him to do, Philo can respond that neither can Cleanthes in explaining how God goes about designing the Universe.

Philo then executes his coup de grace:

And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these
reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still
persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the
Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature
with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever
he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore
he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never mistaken
in choosing the means to any end: but the course of Nature tends not to human or
animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the
whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and
infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy
resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?

With all the suffering in the world, how could we derive the perfect benevolence of God? Demea tries to deny the existence of evil by positing a future existence, i.e. Heaven:

This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this life but a
moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, therefore, are
rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence.

Cleanthes rejects this, saying we cannot make such a supposition without evidence:

No! replied Cleanthes, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be admitted,
contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be
known but from its known effects? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from
the apparent phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another, is building
entirely in the air; and the utmost we ever attain, by these conjectures and
fictions, is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we,
upon such terms, establish its reality.

Instead, Cleanthes tries to deny the predominance of evil over good; he claims that over all, the universe is a good place. Philo disagrees, but he is willing to concede the point; he even is willing to say that it is possible that God is indeed perfectly benevolent. But we would never reach such a conclusion!

Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of
beings, animated and organized, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious
variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living
existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each
other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or
odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind
Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her
lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive
children!

Thus, we do not see goodness in the Universe, but just different life forms struggling for survival, with pleasures and pains associated with that struggle.

Coming from the background of Western society, I find it hard to accept the "vegetation theory" as more plausible than the "design theory." Nevertheless, Philo's other objections seriously undermine the Teleological Argument, and must be taken into consideration when discussing it.

The Existence of God IIIb: The Teleological Argument - Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 1

In my previous post, I started discussion of the Teleological Argument with Dawkins's "Ultimate Boeing 747 Challenge," which I thought the Teleological Argument could withstand. I will now discuss Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, perhaps one of the most thorough discussions of the Teleological Argument, even though it was written about 100 years before Darwin wrote On the Origin of Species.


Cleanthes, one of the characters, begins the discussion:

Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it:
you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an
infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a
degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these
various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other
with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever
contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature,
resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance;
of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the
effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy,
that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar
to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to
the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori,
and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and
his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

Demea, the character who represents traditional religious thought, vigorously protests this argument:

What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No abstract arguments! No
proofs a priori! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by
philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject
than experience and probability?

This is an important thing to note. Only with an a priori argument could we possibly prove absolutely that God exists and has certain attributes. With an a posteriori argument, it is a matter of weighing all evidence, to see whether the evidence supports a claim in either direction. Thus one is reduced to saying that such-and-such a belief is only probably true.

Philo, the chracter who most probably represents Hume's own opinions, builds on this:

What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much
that all religious arguments are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that
they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior
kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity,
we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of
this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference.
The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar
event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever
you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish
proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy,
which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced
the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes
place in Titius and Maevius. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is
only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in
men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer
the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood
circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy,
are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.

Thus it is not clear how strong the evidence is of a designer.

Cleanthes responds:

But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe
so slight a resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and
arrangement of every part?

Philo replies:

Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he
would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind
of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or
situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives
could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his
fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he
adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally
possible.

Thus, it is not clear that one could dervie what led to the current situation, without actually seeing what led to it. Nevertheless, one could respond that the analogy is strong enough to merit this. Philo realizes this, so he tries to poke holes in Cleanthes's argument:

And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow
corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety
can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a
peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms,
is in comparison a pardonable sophism.

Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine. A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we then pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?

Philo so far makes two points: that the Teleological Argument is a vast generalization; and that it is an argument from ignorance, given how little was known of nature at the time the dialogue was written. Nevertheless, even if an argument is based on generalizations and arguments from ignorance, if it is the best response, then it should be the one held until evidence shows to the contrary. This is basically how Cleanthes responds:

but that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the
similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this similarity is
self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; what more is
requisite to shew an analogy between their causes, and to ascertain the origin
of all things from a divine purpose and intention?

Philo responds essentially with Dawkins's argument, which I dealt with in the previous post:

If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from enquiries a priori)
be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, this
sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, or universe
of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, or universe of
objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. For
what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or
inference? In an abstract view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty
attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them.

Cleanthes responds that nevertheless, there seems to be a cause:

The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the
plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the
clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join
in the same testimony: the whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the praises
of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You
start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: you ask me, what is the cause of
this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity;
and here I stop my enquiry.

Philo replies that if so, it does not help to push the argument off a step:

If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can absolutely give an
explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any advantage to shove off for a
moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, must immediately, in its full
force, recur upon me.

This post has already gone on for a while, so I will continue the analysis of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in another post.

The Existence of God IIIa: The Teleological Argument - Ultimate Boeing 747 Gambit

Now that I have discussed the a priori arguments for the existence of God, the Cosmological and Ontological Arguments, it is time to discuss the main a posteriori argument - the Teleological Argument, or Argument from Design or Purpose (though one could argue that my version of the Cosmological Argument is also a posteriori, depending on one's view of causation - see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article, "Kant and Hume on Causality").

I believe most readers are familiar with the Teleological Argument. It is, I believe, the most commonly used argument to demonstrate God's existence. The basic premise is that the Universe (or something within the universe) resembles an object too complex ot have occurred simply through random processes without purpose. Thus, there must be a Designer, namely, God.

Now there are two main streams of objections to this argument. The more common is that the Universe could be the way it is simply through naturalistic, undesigned processes, such as evolution. Now, evolution is a very long and difficult topic, so I will save that for a different post (or several posts).

The other stream is that even if it does appear designed, one runs into problems. A famous argument of this kind is Dawkins's "ultimate Boeing 747 gambit." There is a famous quote by Fred Hoyle where he claims that the Universe being the way it is now without design is like the wind randomly blowing together random scraps of metal and forming a 747. Dawkins replied, that if something could design an object so complex, then it must be at least as complex itself. Thus the Teleological Argument, according to Dawkins, begs the question.

Many religious philosophers have responded by saying that God, as a spirit, is not complex. I feel, though, that while this argument would satisfactorily rebut his claim if true, the question is how we can maintain a doctrine of spirits. After all, do we have any empirical evidence that spirits which are capable of design, yet without complexity, exist? We only see that intelligence exists with complex mechanisms, such as brains (and increasingly, with computers). Thus these religious philosophers would have to prove that intelligence is possible without complexity, based on empirical evidence. This will be hard, though, since one cannot directly observe spirits. Perhaps they would try to argue this from the existence of souls, but this is a separate argument, and I will deal with it in a separate post on the mind-body problem at some point.

I have a different objection to Dawkins's challenge: it doesn't matter if the Designer is more complex! After all, the Designer could have existed since the beginning of the Universe. Thus it would not need a designer, since it has always existed (for more on this idea, see my post on the Cosmological Argument). Thus, with evidence in favor of a Designer, and no question-begging necessary, the argument as it is might hold.

There is also to consider other objections, which David Hume most notably brought up in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, that the Teleological Argument falls short of what it is trying to prove. I will consider this in my next post, where I will walk through Hume's arguments.

The Existence of God II: The Ontological Argument

The second species of arguments in favor of God's existence are the ontological ones. These come in several forms:

A) I have an idea of God.
This idea must have come from somewhere.
The only thing capable of providing this idea is God.
Therefore, God exists.

Hobbes criticized this argument by saying that we have an idea of unicorns. However, they do not exist. Then how did we get the idea? Easy: we combined a horse and a rhinoceros's horn, or something to similar effect.

On the surface, we can dismiss Hobbes's criticism. After all, we have an idea of an infinite God, and since we have never observed an infinite object in nature, we cannot get this idea from simply combining several things that we have observed in our head.

However, the major Empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) all reject this response. True, they say, there is no way to observe an infinite item, so this cannot be the source of an idea of infinity; nonetheless, you don't have any idea of infinite anyway. This is because infinite is not a number; it is just the concept that there is no upper bound to the number. Then how do we get this concept of an infinite God? By, as Hume said, increasing the number without limit. But why did we do this for God? Hume says in his Natural History of Religion,

Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessor in swelling up the titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed; till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no farther progress.

Therefore, this version of the Ontological Argument falls flat.

B) God is the most-perfect being: omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, etc.
If God did not exist, then I could think of a more perfect being: one that did exist.
Therefore, if God did not exist, we would have a contradiction.
Therefore, God exists.

Kant succinctly responded: Existence is not a predicate. Existence is the basis for the attribution of predicates. If one denies that something exists, then one denies the description of it as well. So, if God does not exist, there is not most-perfect being.

If one persists in insisting that existence is indeed a predicate, I can simply respond that it then might contradict the other predicates in God: namely, its existence might preclude its omniscience, etc.

I also would like to point out that perfection is a relative term. Something cannot be simply perfect; it has to be perfect for something. How, then, do we know our idea of perfection is correct? Alternatively, there could be different perfections for different things. Does that mean that there are different most-perfect beings, such as a most-perfect cow, or a most perfect balloon?

Supposedly some philosophers, such as Alvin Plantinga, have responses for this, but I feel this is tough to refute.

C) God is a possible necessary being.
If it is possibly necessary, then it is necessary.
Therefore God is a necessary being.
Therefore God exists.

We can simply respond to this that if it is possibly necessary, then it is not necessary, so God might not exist. The confusion arises from using "necessary" in two different senses - necessary in that the world depends on Him, and necessary in that the world is inconceivable without Him.

I hope I correctly represented all of the positions here.

The Existence of God I: The Cosmological Argument

I'll start this weighty topic with a quote from David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in response to Demea's presentation of the Cosmological Argument:

But dropping all these abstractions, continued Philo, and confining ourselves to
more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument a
priori has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical
head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding
from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth through
obscurity, and, contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same habit
of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of
good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in
such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it
lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive their religion
from other sources than from this species of reasoning.

The question, before we proceed, is this: do we need any independent proof of God's existence to demonstrate the truth of religion? After all, even if we do accomplish this, what difference does it make? Do we instantly know what religion entails? No; we must rely on revelation for this. If so, then what difference does this proof make at all? We must rely on an adequately-proved revelation in any case, thus obviating the need for a proof of the existence of God.

This challenge is very interesting and important to bear in mind. However, I think I can come up with a response to it. In the process of proving the existence of a god, one may come to simultaneously find that this god, through the manifestation of the proof, must be interested in humankind. Thus, we would expect to see some divine involvement in human affairs, such as commanding man how to act. Therefore, any extant revelations would be granted additional weight in determining their validity.

Now, whether a proof of God's interest in humankind is possible, I will not deal with here. For now, I will content myself to discussing the Cosmological Argument.

Growing up, the reason that I believed in God, was, essentially, the Cosmological Argument: every effect must have a cause, and we can trace the causes back to God. The criticism, "Who created God?" didn't bother me - God was the "Prime Mover," and thus didn't need a cause. One could not say the same, though, for the Universe, as it clearly had a beginning - the Big Bang. Since the appearance of the Universe in such a fashion seems to violate the laws of physics, I assumed that there must be something that can break these laws to create the Universe - namely, God.

However, as I got older, I realized that there are many problems with this argument. Firstly, I had not demonstrated that God must be the first cause - there could be something else before him that caused him, and something that caused that, extending back to an infinite amount of time. However, I was able to respond to this in two ways: first, that it does not matter whether God is the Prime Mover or not (after all, the pagan gods were all born in some manner of theogony or another); and second, that the chain of causes and effects could not go back to infinity - an infinite amount of time can never go to completion, so the Universe can not be infinitely old.

However, there is a more devastating criticism of the Cosmological Argument: so what? All we have proven is that there is a first cause; we have not proven that this is intelligent, continues to act within the Universe, cares about mankind, or anything else. This is exactly the criticism Hume had for the argument, and it stands.

We are, nevertheless, left with a problem: how did the Universe start, if it broke the laws of physics? Now, while this is not a science blog, I will offer the following suggestion (though it is probably better to talk to a professional physicist about this instead). We assumed that it broke the laws of physics. However, we assumed that the laws of physics were in place when the Universe appeared. This, however, we can deny. The Universe, along with everything that governs it, such as gravity, electromagnetism, and even space and time did not exist prior to the universe. Thus the universe could "spontaneously" (obviously not actually spontaneously, since time did not exist without the universe) appear, without any violations of the laws of physics.

The Nature of the Dispute

Before I actually touch any of the issues, I want to discuss why the argument over belief in Judaism (or any other religion) exists at all.

When I hear and read about the arguments, they become heated very quickly. The believer quickly accuses the skeptic of having insincere motives (i.e. he/she is just looking for an excuse to do whatever he/she wants), and the skeptic accuses the believer of being an idiot. This again leaves me in the position of Elihu ben Berachel - the argument quickly runs out of hand, with no side making any progress. Let us first analyze, are these accusations from either side true?

First I will deal with the position of the believer. From my personal experience, I must admit that they are for the most part correct. Now I expect a lot of flack for this statement. But let us analyze this critically. Who is more likely to question the validity of the religion in which they participate? Is it not the person who is unhappy with the religion? It seems to me that the person who is content with his lot is indeed more likely to not question it. This, I have seen, is often borne out in my experience. What is interesting is that often the people who fall into this category don't even realize it - they think that they have thought their conclusions out, but clearly they have not.

However, it is absolutely not true that this is universally the case. There are, indeed, many issues that must be dealt with in examining religion. The believer quickly jumps on the cases where there may be ulterior motives and generalizes. I personally know people who genuinely struggled with the issues, patiently weighing the arguments on both sides, until they came to a decision. I believe I fall into such a category - I struggled with the issues for over two years until I came to a decision (even consciously giving more weight to the religious perspective - I'll discuss this in the next paragraph).

Additionally, the idea that there is a motivation to become a nonbeliever is ridiculous, once one thinks about it. Consider the options - you get a little bit of good now for sinning and a whole lot of bad later in terms of punishment, or you can do something that may cause you a bit of discomfort now (or even some good now - depending whether one likes to perform the mitzvot), and a whole lot of good later. Clearly the motivation is to choose the latter. Note that I have now turned Pascal's Wager on its head - clearly the motivation lies in the direction of becoming religious, if one is interested in long-term planning. Additionally, as I mentioned above, there may be motivation to perform the mitzvot themselves - I personally enjoy Shabbat very much, and was thus interested in keeping the meaning behind it. Thus the skeptic could argue in a similar manner that the believer is seduced into believing.

Returning now to the skeptic's position, I think it suffices to say that this is clearly not true. There are plenty of extremely intelligent Orthodox people, as well as plenty of extremely ignorant ones; however, this is just as true for the nonbelievers as well. Much of the beliefs simply stem from the exposure to the arguments, upbringing, life experience, etc.

If only we could avoid all the insults that universally get tossed around in these kind of discussions.

Intro to this blog

Before I actually start writing about anything, I should probably mention a little bit about myself, and what the purpose of this blog is.

I come to the blogging sphere searching for the truth, wherever it may lead, in the realm of Jewish belief. Now, obviously, there are plenty of blogs already out there that deal at length with this subject. Unfortunately, upon reading them, I find myself in the position of Elihu ben Berachel - almost none of the blogs seem to touch the crux of the matters. They often do not deal with many of the major issues, and when they do, the protagonists on both sides offer arguments that I feel I can refute.

So, I feel that it is time for a fresh start. This blog will be purely dedicated to expounding on the issues involved in belief in Orthodox Judaism. I am not afraid to challenge positions held on either side. I welcome all criticism of my positions - I wish to form correct opinions, not simply throw preconceived views at the readers. However, this does not mean that I do not have already thought about the issues - I have formed opinions based on my reflections and readings. Please bear this in mind.

Also, please note that no ad hominem remarks will be tolerated, no matter whom the come from. If I see any such comments, I will delete them. I will try to hold to this standard myself. If any reader thinks that I have made an ad hominem remark, please let me know and I will modify my post.

Now that I have introduced this blog, it is time to post.